Nuclear fuel supply chain supply chain chokepoints

category tradeable chokepoint

How scores are shown

Criticality comes from the trace model and describes the node's dependency importance.

Evidence comes from the canonical Vein Graph: AI assertions, user corrections, and external sources.

Completeness is a data-coverage label based on available summary, evidence, sources, tickers, and chokepoint rationale.

Dynamic claims are capped below 100% and AI-only edges remain labeled as inferred. Model: trace-score-v1.

Uranium mining (U3O8)90% confidence — Kazakhstan supplies roughly 40% of primary uranium; Western utilities seek non-Russian sources.

Yellowcake conversion90% confidence — Conversion capacity outside Russia is limited; Cameco and ConverDyn are key Western options.

Uranium enrichment (SWU)90% confidence — Russia historically supplied a large share of enrichment services; sanctions reshaped flows.

HALEU for advanced reactors83% confidence — Commercial HALEU supply chain is nascent; DOE programs are seeding capacity.

Nuclear fuel supply chainEnergy

From uranium mining through conversion, enrichment, and fuel-rod fabrication for reactor fleets.

Criticality: unknownEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: thin

Uranium mining (U3O8)Mining⚠ chokepoint

ISR and conventional mines in Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, and Australia.

Kazakhstan supplies roughly 40% of primary uranium; Western utilities seek non-Russian sources.90% confidence

CCJ—Camecostock

ProducerSupplies into this nodeSupply-chain context only — not investment advice.

UUUU—Energy Fuelsstock

ProducerSupplies into this nodeSupply-chain context only — not investment advice.

Criticality: highEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: partial

Yellowcake conversionProcessing⚠ chokepoint

Conversion of U3O8 to UF6 feed for enrichment plants.

Conversion capacity outside Russia is limited; Cameco and ConverDyn are key Western options.90% confidence

Criticality: highEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: partial

— core tradeable element

Uranium enrichment (SWU)Enrichment⚠ chokepoint

Gas centrifuge cascades producing LEU for power reactors.

Russia historically supplied a large share of enrichment services; sanctions reshaped flows.90% confidence

Criticality: highEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: partial

— core tradeable element

Fuel rod fabricationFabricationhigh criticality

Pelletizing, cladding, and assembly into fuel assemblies for PWR/BWR reactors.

Criticality: highEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: thin

— core tradeable element

HALEU for advanced reactorsNext-gen fuel⚠ chokepoint

High-assay low-enriched uranium for SMRs and advanced reactor designs.

Commercial HALEU supply chain is nascent; DOE programs are seeding capacity.83% confidence

Criticality: mediumEvidence: UnverifiedCompleteness: partial

— core tradeable element

Generated analysis — not investment advice.

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